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Revenue Seeking:
A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs

Jagdish N. Bhagwati
Columbia University

T. N. Srinivasan
Yale Universityand World Bank

The theory of commercial policy has recently addressed three phenomena: (i) tariff (quota) seeking or lobbying by potential beneficiaries for the imposition of a tariff (quota), (ii) tariff (quota)
evasion, and (iii) rent seeking or lobbying for getting an allocation of
the import quota to earn the rents generated. Revenue seeking or
lobbying to secure a share in the disposition of the tariff revenues is
analyzed here. It is shown that revenue seeking may, even for a small
country, result in a reduction in importable output. Furthermore,
revenue seeking may be welfare improving. Rent seeking may be
welfare improving as well.

I.

The Problem

The formal theory of commercial policy, as constituted by the theory
of trade and welfare, has traditionally failed to incorporate three
types of phenomena that attend the imposition of tariffs:
Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation grant no. SOC79-07541 for
financialsupport of Bhagwati.The commentsof ClarkLeith, Peter Kenen, Ed Tower,
Alan Deardorff, Anne Krueger, Peter Diamond, Peter Neary, Max Corden, Michael
Michaely,Alasdair Smith, and Gordon Tullock on an earlier draft (Bhagwati 1979),
which this substantiallyaugmented and revised version replaces,have been very helpful. The commentsof two anonymousreferees and of the editor,Jacob Frenkel,have
been helpful as well. Views expressed are not necessarilythose of the institutionswith
which we are affiliated.
Journal of Political Economy, 1980, vol. 88, no. 6]
? 1980 by The University of Chicago. 0022-3808/80/8806-0001$01.50
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1. Tariff seeking (or tariff making): Where tariffs are imposed, for
example, for protective (or other income-distributional) reasons, the
potential beneficiaries of these protective tariffs will often lobby for
their imposition.
2. Tariff evasion (or smuggling): Where tariffs exist, there is an
incentive to evade them via smuggling, whether overt or in the form
of overinvoicing and underinvoicing.
3. Revenue seeking: Where tariffs are imposed for, say, protective
reasons, they will simultaneously happen to generate revenue. This,
in turn, will generate a lobbying process to secure a share in the
disposition of the revenues.
For each of the tariff (or "price") phenomena, there are corresponding QR (or "command") phenomena. Thus we have (1) QR
seeking for protective reasons, (2) QR evasion, and (3) rent seeking,
where there is (perfect or imperfect) competition and lobbying to get
the licenses and hence earn the premia/rents that are associated with
them, the licenses themselves having emerged from the (conceptually
distinct) QR-seeking lobby's success at having the QRs established.
The first area of neglect has been addressed in much recent work,
especially that of Brock and Magee (1978), and is attracting attention
from analysts whose main objective is to explain why tariffs are what
they are and, as in Cheh (1974), why they change in the way they do.'
Recent analytical developments have also addressed the second
area of neglect, beginning with the analysis of smuggling in the
presence of tariffs by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), utilizing the 2 x 2
HOS (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) model of trade theory. Numerous extensions of their work have followed, especially by Johnson
(1972), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973), Bhagwati (1974), Sheikh
(1974), and Ray (1978). Falvey (1978) has extended the analysis to
smuggling in the presence of QRs, noting the nonequivalence of
tariffs and QRs that follows in this case.2
However, the third area of neglect curiously continues to remain so.
The familiar Meade (1952) assumption of lump-sum redistribution of
tariff revenues has been widely used, preventing the analysis of revenue seeking, that is, the expenditure of real resources in the activity of
getting a share of the revenues resulting from tariff imposition. That
lobbies exist, and utilize real resources for pursuit of a share in the
revenues that are disbursed by the state, is so obvious from the most
1 There has been practically no integration of this work into general-equilibrium
analysis or into the theory of trade and welfare. An important beginning has, however,
been made by Findlay and Wellisz (1979).
2 The phenomena of overinvoicing and underinvoicing, whose detection and economic causation have been analyzed in Bhagwati (1964, 1967), can also be analyzed
identically as smuggling.
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casual observation as to require no extended justification. However,
whether the share of such revenues that gets to be sought through
such lobbying is unity or less, on the average or for marginal increment in revenues, is a matter for empirical evaluation, and the setting
up of "rules" subject to which revenues are disbursed is evidently a
factor that tends to reduce this ratio below unity in many empirical
contexts. The analysis of revenue seeking below, therefore, allows for
the share of tariff revenues that is sought to vary below unity.
Our analysis of revenue seeking is developed in Sections II-V and
is conducted within the general-equilibrium framework of the HOS
model, thus permitting us to relate our findings readily to the main
corpus of the general equilibrium theory of trade. Thus we are able,
for example, to demonstrate how revenue seeking may, even for a
small country, result in a reduction, rather than an increase, in the
output of the importable industry.
By also focusing on the fact that, given the tariff, the introduction
of resource-diverting revenue-seeking activity implies the withdrawal
of factors from gainful employment into a zero-output activity in a
tariff-distorted economy, we demonstrate the not-insignificant possibility (Sec. III) that revenue seeking may be welfare improving, and
we establish the conditions for it to arise (Sec. IV), indicating therewith that this is a paradox but not a "theoretical curiosum."
As already noted, the "command" or QR counterpart of our revenue-seeking phenomenon is what Krueger (1974) has called "rent
seeking." Her invaluable analysis of this phenomenon, conducted
with the framework of a rather special, simplified model of complete
specialization on one good but complicated via the introduction of
a "distribution" sector, reached, however, the conclusion that rent
seeking is always welfare worsening. This central conclusion is unfortunately not sustainable, as our analysis of revenue seeking, extended readily to rent seeking under a QR instead (in Sec. V), readily
shows.
This reversal of her central conclusion, as also her exclusion of the
possibility of revenue seeking, vitiates, furthermore, her "nonequivalence" proposition, that QRs are always inferior to tariffs because they
attract rent seeking, embodied in the conclusion that "the major
proposition of this paper is that competitive rent-seeking for import
licenses entails a welfare cost in addition to the welfare cost that would
be incurred if the same level of imports were achieved through
tariffs" (1974, p. 295; emphasis added). Quite aside from the fact that
rent seeking may be welfare improving and hence a QR with rent
seeking may dominate a tariff without revenue seeking, Krueger's
conclusion presupposes inappropriately that whereas the success of a
protectionist lobby in getting a QR imposed will result in a rent-
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seeking scramble for all the resulting premia/rents on the import
licenses, an equivalent success of the protectionist lobby in getting a
tariff enacted3 will be characterized by a total absence of a revenueseeking scramble for a share of the resulting tariff revenues!4 Since
even QRs are often allocated by reference to "rules," or assigned to
public-sector trading agencies or public-sector user corporations, a
substantial fraction of the QR-generated rents is not "sought" in
practice, whereas doubtless some fraction of revenues is sought, so
that the extreme and opposed assumptions concerning tariffs and
QRs underlying Krueger's comparison thereof are unpersuasive.
A proper welfare comparison of tariffs and quotas, with both revenue seeking and rent seeking, is therefore undertaken by us in Section VI and is shown nonetheless to imply nonequivalence between
the two under alternative, precise definitions of nonequivalence.
Quite remarkably, different assumptions concerning the extent of
revenue seeking and rent seeking are not necessary for this outcome.
Finally, in Section VII, we briefly reexamine the question of measuring the cost of protection, once revenue seeking is introduced.
II. Tariff Equilibrium with Revenue Seeking: The Geometry
Consider the standard 2 x 2 HOS model, with factors K and L, goods
1 and 2, a set of social indifference curves,5 and the "small-" country
assumption so that the world goods price ratio is given.
The standard representation of a tariff equilibrium in this case is as
in figure 1, with world price ratio (equal to minus the slope of the line)
3The protectionist lobby will be indifferent whether it gets its protection through a
tariff or a QR-in a world with certainty and full flexibility of QRs and tariffs in
response to changing conditions. Evidently, this is not realistic, as noted in Bhagwati
(1965).
4The problem with Krueger's argument stems evidently from the focus of the
trade-and-developmental economists during the early 1970s on QR-generated rents.
Thus, in analyzing the Indian economy's reliance on industrial and import licensing,
one of us had argued (Bhagwati 1973) that the system was creating a rentier society
rather than encouraging the emergence of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. The growth
of a rentier class, and the rent-seeking activities, in a society with reliance on QRs was
thus foremost in our thoughts. What one forgot then was that such rent seeking would
be paralleled by revenue seeking if the same objectives were to be sought by "price"
rather than "command" instruments, and therefore that a proper comparison between, say, a tariff and a quota to achieve a target increase in importable production,
for example, would have to include revenue seeking for the tariff case if rent seeking
was included in the quota case. This problem with the Krueger analysis was noted and
discussed in Bhagwati (1978), but the need for a corrected analysis was merely indicated
there and is being responded to in this paper.
5For those who may find it offensive to assume social indifference curves (with
attendant lump-sum transfers) in an analysis of revenue seeking, we may note that our
conclusions are equally robust if we use the increment in the availability locus at world
prices as a welfare improvement criterion in itself.
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PtCt, free-trade production at P*, tariff-policy production and consumption at Pt and Ct, and the associated tariff revenue as EF in terms
of good 1. Lump-sum transfer of revenues to consumers is assumed.
Now introduce revenue seeking into this HOS model. Envisage a
production function in revenue seeking, with Kr and L4 being the
factors used in rent seeking. It is evident that, given competition in
this activity, the Kr/Lrratio will be chosen to minimize costs, given the
market values of the rental (r) and the wage (w).
In the 2 x 2 model, as long as we confine ourselves to incomplete
specialization in production (as we do throughout Secs. II and III, but
not in Sec. IV), the tariff-inclusive domestic goods price ratio (CtF =
PtE in fig. 1) will determine the factor price ratio, that is, the w and r
faced by revenue seekers, and forthwith the Kr/Lrratio.
Given this choice of Kr/Lrratio, the total factors withdrawn from use
in goods production at Pt will equal the amount of tariff revenue that
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we assume to be subject to seeking. This follows from the fact that
throughout we assume competitive revenue seeking. Our analysis will
divide the total tariff revenue into two parts: the revenue that is
sought and the Meade-type lump-sum transfer that escapes the seeking process. However, we will focus presently on the (empirically
improbable) case where all revenue is sought and, only in Secs. III
and IV, consider the case where some Meade-type transfer is permitted.6

Finally, the withdrawal of Kr and Lr for rent seeking will correspondingly reduce the total amount of factors available for production of goods 1 and 2. On the other hand, given the fixity of goods
and factor prices, it is equally evident that the domestic consumption
of goods will lie on the domestic expenditure line which is identical to
the national-income-at-factor-cost line PtE in figure 1. For domestic
expenditure must equal domestic income in the revenue-seeking
equilibrium, and the latter is nothing but the value of factors used in
goods production plus the value of factors diverted to revenue seeking, which adds up to the value of all factors at w and r associated with
Pt and hence to national income at factor cost at Pt.
The resulting revenue-seeking equilibrium is readily illustrated in
figure 1. The domestic expenditure (or national income at factor cost)
line is PtE. Consumption must therefore occur at Cr. Moreover, the
world price line must pass through Cr, so CrQ is the world price line
through Cr. At the same time, the new production point must lie on
CrQ, while it also lies on the generalized Rybczynski line PtRt-which
is the locus of successive production points, at constant domestic
goods price ratio PtE, as factors are successively withdrawn for revenue seeking in proposition Kr/Lr. The production point that satisfies
both the requirements is therefore clearly Pr Then the difference
between Cr and Pr defines CrH as the import level, with tariff revenue
now at GE: the value of factor income in goods production being OG,
in revenue seeking being GE, and in aggregate being OE.
Note immediately that welfare falls, with the introduction of competitive revenue seeking, from Ut to Ur. This appears to be a thoroughly intuitive conclusion since resources are being diverted by
revenue seeking to a "wasteful" activity with zero output (in terms of
social valuation).7 However, as we note in Section III, this intuition
6 We will not, however, consider imperfectly competitive revenue seeking. As Tullock
(1978) has noted in an interesting contribution, imperfectly competitive rent seeking
may result in resource diversion that is less than the rents sought, and this is true, of
course, of revenue seeking as well.
'We are not assuming, with Tullock (1967), that tariff revenues are applied to
wasteful projects such as building "tunnels that lead nowhere." However, revenue
seeking leads to an outcome, in our analysis, that implies an identical zero-output
diversion of resources.
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needs correction: The welfare-worsening outcome is not the only
possibility.8
III.

Possible Paradoxes in the Presence of Revenue Seeking

Among the less compelling "paradoxical" outcomes, the following are
evident from figure 1 on a little reflection.
i) The new, revenue-seeking equilibrium level of imports may exceed or be less than the original (prior to revenue seeking) equilibrium, that is, in view of similar triangles, as CrPr
CtPt. This has
implications for the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, as argued in
Section VI.
ii) The tariff revenue in the revenue-seeking equilibrium may exceed, equal, or be less than the original tariff revenue (GE c EF).
iii) Quite remarkably, the cost of revenue seeking shown in figure 1
is independent of any change in the production function of the
revenue-seeking activity as long as the resulting shift in the Rybczynski line PtRt continues to keep it intersecting CrQ at a point
Pr representing incomplete specialization in the production of goods 1
and 2.9
However, the most remarkable paradoxes are the following in the
positive and welfare analyses of tariffs.
iv) If the objective in imposing a tariff was to protect and thus
increase the output of the importable good 2, the small-country assumption does ensure the absence of the Metzler production paradox
(Pt, relative to P*, implies an increase in the output of the protected
good 2), when revenue seeking is absent. However, once revenue
seeking is introduced, the Metzler paradox may arise despite the
small-country assumption as when Pr is shifted to P' with CrQ and a
modified PtRt intersecting at P' to the southwest of P*.
v) Again, the change in the production of the importable good
following on revenue seeking opens up the interesting possibility that,
in the presence of welfare-worsening revenue seeking, a target increase in the production of the importable good above the free-trade
level may involve a lower (or a higher) tariff than in the absence of the
revenue-seeking activity and, correspondingly, a lower (or a higher)
welfare loss than that arising from a tariff without revenue seeking.
vi) More remarkably, we can show that revenue seeking may be
welfare improving. To do this simply, we now consider the possibility
8 The full range of outcomes, and the conditions determining them, are the subject of
the analysis in Sec. IV.
9 This proposition, however, does not hold for less than full competitive revenue
seeking or where only a fraction of the revenue earned is sought and where complete
specialization in production results.
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that part of the revenue is handled as a Meade-type lump-sum transfer and only the remainder is competitively sought, so that the value
of factors diverted to revenue seeking is less than the total revenue.
Thus, consider figure 2, which uses much the same lettering as figure
1, and the income-consumption line at the tariff-inclusive domestic
price ratio has been drawn. The difference is that the Rybczynski line
PtRt is now drawn flatter than the international price line PtN. A
possible revenue-seeking equilibrium is then shown at Pr, C with total
revenue collected at GE, the revenue offered and sought at GJ, and
the lump-sum Meade-type transfer beingJE. Thus welfare improves
with revenue seeking to U (> Ut), and the proportion of tariff revenue disbursed to revenue seekers is less than unity, the proportion
being GJIGE.
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This paradox is immediately resolved as soon as we recognize that
the welfare-improving diversion of resources to the zero-output
revenue-seeking activity in the tariff-distorted situation is formally
identical to, and indeed the mirror image of, the phenomenon of
immiserizing growth where the augmentation of resources in a
tariff-distorted economy can immiserize the economy (as shown by
Johnson [1967] and generalized in Bhagwati [1968]). Alternatively,
the paradox can be understood by recognizing that the analytical
problem of revenue seeking is equivalent formally to the problem of
project evaluation in trade-distorted, small economies. In the latter
case, given the trade distortion, resources are withdrawn for project
use and can have a negative shadow price, as demonstrated and discussed in Bhagwati, Srinivasan, and Wan (1978) and Srinivasan and
Bhagwati (1978), such that even a zero-output "project" (such as a
"Keynesian" project to dig ditches and fill them up, under full employment) may be socially desirable. Analogously, in the former case,
the zero-output, "wasteful" diversion of resources into revenue seeking from the trade-distorted equilibrium can be welfare improving:
The shadow price of (one of the two) factors being withdrawn into
revenue seeking may be negative.'0
Once we have formulated the problem in mathematical terms, in
the next section, it will be possible for us to go beyond a mere
demonstration of this paradox and to delineate "zones" into which the
Rybczynski line (R-line) may lie and thereby establish the conditions
under which the outcome of revenue seeking may be welfare worsening or welfare improving. We therefore turn immediately to this
analysis.
IV.

Tariff Equilibrium with Revenue Seeking: The Mathematics

A. Formally, our model is simply stated as follows. We have:" ki =
the (distorted-equilibrium) capital-output ratio, ti = the (distortedequilibrium) labor-output ratio, and Xi = output (activity) level, where
i = 1, 2, r; YXiki = K, the fixed factor endowment of capital; .Xifi =
L, the fixed factor endowment of labor; and there are two goods, 1
and 2, and the revenue-seeking activity denoted by suffix r. As long as
incomplete specialization in the production of goods 1 and 2 holds, as
we assume initially, the coefficients k1and ti are as at the nonseeking
tariff-distorted equilibrium (i.e., as at Pt in figs. 1, 2). As considered
10As Bhagwati et al. (1978) argue, the negative shadow price of a factor is a necessary,
but not a sufficient, condition for a zero-output project to be welfare improving.
11The "hats" on the variables ki and {i refer to their values reflecting the tariffdistorted equilibrium. For incomplete specialization, ki and 1i are obviously fixed parameters.
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later, these coefficients will generally change after specialization in
production is reached on good 1 or 2 with sufficient primary factor
withdrawal to revenue seeking, and our analysis must be changed
correspondingly.
The question at hand is, What is the welfare impact of factor
withdrawal for revenue seeking? To consider this question, assume a
standard social utility function, U = U(C1, C2). We can then show that
dU/dXr has the same sign as dCi/dXr, and therefore the sign of the
latter is sufficient to determine the welfare impact of revenue seeking.
E1 and C2 = X2 + ElIp*, where C1, C2 are
Thus, note that C1 = Xthe consumption levels of goods 1 and 2, E is the export of good 1,
and p* is the relative international price of good 1.
It follows that, given the tariff rate t, we have:
U2

Ui

= p*(1 + t) X: d'2
t)

dXrU2U

: ) dCl

U21U,-

dr

U1U

dCl
dXrX

where 0

>

0 under normality in consumption of both goods. Now,

dU =

dC, +_ U2 dC2 _Uj[j1

dXr

dXr

P(
+

dXr

(

)

dCl
dXr

(1)

so that Sgn (dUldXr)= Sgn (dCldXr). Next, note that C1 + p*C2 = X1 +
p*X2, from the balance of payments being assumed zero. Hence
dCl + P

dXr

dC2
dXr

-

dX + p*

dX2

dXr

dXr'

and therefore12
(1 + OP*) dX =

(r

2kr)+ (kr - klr)p*

(2)

But we can now introduce the concept of second-best shadow prices
of primary factors at the tariff-distorted equilibrium, wz*and r*, these
being calculated 'ala Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1978) as the solution to
the two equations,'3 1 = Aiw* + kri*, and p* = w* + k2r*, which
yields
p*kl - k2

(3)

This is derived by substituting for dXi/dXr(i = 1, 2) from ki(dXi/dXr) + k2(dX2/dXr)=
(full utilization of capital) and 11(dX1/dXr) + 12(dX2/dXr)= -r (full employment of
labor).
13 The hats on wb*and r* refer to the fact that these shadow prices reflect the
tariff-distorted equilibrium coefficients, ki and 4i,while the asterisks refer to the optimi12

-kr
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i,-

P*'(4)

Substituting (3) and (4) into (2), we then get

(1 + Op*) dC1 -

1(rw* + rr*).

(5)

Therefore, given (1) and (5), we deduce that
du

Sgn dXr

=

Sgn -(irw* +

kr?*).

(6)

This result is easily understood, for revenue seeking withdraws
primary factors from the tariff-distorted resource allocation. The
"output" from this revenue-seeking activity has a zero social valuation.
Therefore, the welfare impact of the revenue seeking will be negative
or positive exclusively as the social cost of the factors withdrawn; that
is, (trw* + krr *) is positive or negative.
Note, moreover, that the
social cost of the factors withdrawn is equal to, and in fact derived
from, the social cost defined in terms of the revenue-seeking-caused
change in output of goods 1 and 2, valued at the international prices;
that is, it equals (AX, + p*AX2).
B. Next we can delineate three zones, around the initial tariffdetermined production equilibrium Pt in figures 1 and 2, wherein the
R-line may lie, with corresponding welfare-impact implications.15
In figure 3, we show Pt and the relevant segment of the production
possibility curve. The three zones, I, II, and III, are then evidently
designated by drawing the vertical and horizontal lines through Pt.
Since the entry of the R-line into the three zones implies differential
behavior of X1 and X2 vis-a'-visPt, since this behavior can, in turn, be
tied into the social cost of the factors diverted to revenue seeking (as
noted at the end of the preceding subsection A) and therefore directly
into the welfare impact of revenue seeking, we first derive the formulae governing AX, and AX2 in response to revenue seeking.
Thus, assuming X1 and XOto be the initial output levels atPt, and the
production levels with revenue-seeking activity at level Xr > 0 (but
with incomplete specialization in production) to be X1 and X2, and
zation; they are therefore second-best shadow factor prices. Also see the important
paper of Findlay and Wellisz (1976) on second-best shadow prices.
14 Seen thus, the criterion for the sign of the welfare impact of revenue seeking in (6)
is a special case of the criterion for evaluating the desirability of a project, the special
case consisting in the "project" having zero output.
15 For an analogous delineation of welfare-improving and welfare-worsening cones in
the context of making resource-allocational inferences from domestic resource calculations in trade-distorted economies, see Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1979).
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defining AX1 = X, - X?1and AX2= X2 - X0,we have the following: Xjkj
L =
+ X2k2 + Xrkr=K = X~jkj+ X02k2,
+
and XiA + X2~
i+
=rt
Then k1AX, + k2AX2= Xrkr,and AiAX, + t2AK2 = -~Xr4rHence
X02i.

AX1

W-

2-

Ik

(7)

and

Now, without loss of generality, assume that good 1 is the exportable and, moreover, capital intensive, that is, kfllo > k2i2, and,
further, that Xr> 0. Then we can conclude:
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Zone I: AX1< 0 and zAX2> 0. This zone will necessarily be entered
by the R-line if k4/4, > k,/i/ > k2f2, as evident from (7) and (8). Recall
that the social cost of revenue seeking is (AX1 + p*zAX2),which is, of
course, the same as Xr(Vr * + krr*). Therefore, we can see from figure
3 that, given the fact that the free-trade production point P* is to the
right of Pt (because good 1 is assumed to be the exportable), welfare
improvement cannot occur in zone I since the output of the exportable (importable) decreases (increases) compared with Pt. Revenue
seeking will therefore be necessarily welfare worsening.
Zone LI:AX1- 0 and zAX2- 0. This zone will necessarily be entered
by the R-line if k1/A- kr/ir ? k2/12,as evident from (7) and (8). Again,
it follows that revenue seeking cannot be welfare improving, as seen
immediately from the social-cost formula, (AX1 + p*zX2).
< 0. This zone will necessarily be entered
Zone III: AX1> 0 and zAX2
by the R-line if kal/l > k'2/i2 > kr/tr. In this zone (and this zone alone),
therefore, it is evident from figure 3, as also from the socialcost formula, that welfare-improving revenue seeking can occur. It
will occur, furthermore, if and only if (frw* + jrr*) < 0.
Moreover, we may subdivide zone III with the dashed international
price line PtQ. The R-lines in the subzone to the left of PtQ evidently
must result in necessary welfare worsening, whereas the R-lines in the
subzone to the right of PtQ must result in welfare improvement.'6
V.

Quota Equilibrium with Rent Seeking

Consider now the replacement of a tariff with a quota that is equivalent to it if there is neither revenue seeking nor rent seeking. Furthermore, let there be fully competitive rent seeking.
Note first that, in the final rent-seeking equilibrium, the rents on
imports must equal the value of factors devoted to rent seeking,
exactly as the tariff revenues equaled the value of the factors devoted
to revenue seeking. Next, the generalized R-line PtR for rent seeking
(at the initial implicit tariff) need not be identical to that for revenue
seeking since the KIL ratio in the two seeking activities may differ.
Thus consider figure 4, where the initial quota equilibrium, in the
absence of rent seeking, is at Pt, Ct and the quota is for import-level M.

Assuming that PtRr is the generalized R-line (at the initial implicit
16
Note, however, that an R-line in the welfare-improving subzone of zone III, on
reaching complete specialization, will wind back toward the origin and so will eventually
enter the welfare-worsening zones. Finally, we may note that (as we have shown at some
length in a subsection which is not being published for reasons of economy of space but
which is available from us on request) the paradoxical possibility of welfare-improving
revenue seeking is compatible with the share of revenue seeking in total revenue being
unity, although, that would imply, in our model, that the economy would have reached
complete specialization. Where the economy is incompletely specialized, the share of
revenue seeking is less than unity.
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tariff) for diversion of factors to rent seeking and that the implicit
tariff will remain unchanged in the rent-seeking equilibrium, production will shift Pr with consumption at Cr. Evidently, in that event,
the import level would be CS and the resources diverted to rent
seeking would be worth GE, the value of the rents in terms of X1.
However, the critical difference now from the tariff analysis is that
CrS < M so that the quota is not binding, thus contradicting the
premise underlying the analysis! The rent-seeking equilibrium will
therefore involve a different implicit tariff, with its associated R-line
(which will be different from the original R-line because it will start
from a different point on AB and the KIL ratio in rent seeking will
have changed with the implicit tariff). If normality of each good in
consumption is assumed and we assume that the R-lines do not cross
despite the changing KIL ratios in rent seeking, the situation depicted
in figure 4 will involve equilibrium at a lower implicit tariff.
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Among the important conclusions that follow from the rent-seeking
analysis is that the Metzler production paradox can evidently arise
now as much as with the tariff plus revenue-seeking equilibrium: A
QR may wind up deprotecting the importable industry!
The other paradoxes established for the revenue-seeking case in
Section III will hold, mutatis mutandis, in the rent-seeking case. In
particular, we should note that rent seeking can be welfare improving
as much as revenue seeking was shown to be. And the condition for
this paradox to arise can be put into the same shadow-wage format as
in (6) for revenue seeking. This can be done by noting that, with the
QR resulting in changes in factor-use coefficients and prices facing
consumers even for "small" changes in rent-seeking activity, we cannot work with changes in value of output foregone at international
prices as our welfare-impact index. The shadow prices of factors must
therefore be expressed directly in terms of the effect on the utility
function and can be derived to be
w

= U(d(

+

Pi

dX2) (X, fixed),

di:

(9)

and

r* =u(d

i

d2(X

fixed),

(10)

wherefl(ki, /i) = 1, i = 1, 2, r, are the "intensive" production functions
in the three activities. We can then get the welfare impact of rent
seeking quite simply into the now-familiar format as
dU_ =(tr

+ kri*)

(11)

dXr

and the welfare-improving paradox will evidently reappear when the
bracketed social cost is negative and leads to dUldXr > 0.

VI.

The Nonequivalence

of Tariffs and Quotas

The preceding analysis has immediate implications for the question of
whether tariffs and quotas are equivalent once seeking activities are
introduced. Specifically, if the import level in the revenue-seeking
equilibrium were turned into a quota (with attendant rent seeking),
and all revenues and rents were fully and competitively sought, would
this quota lead to an identical implicit tariff as the explicit tariff that
was being replaced-this being the equivalence definition of Bhagwati (1965)? That is, if the import level in the tariff-with-revenue-
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seeking equilibrium (i.e., CrH in fig. 1) were turned into a quota and
rent seeking were then present, would not this quota lead to an
identical real equilibrium, with the implicit tariff equal to the earlier
explicit tariff and therefore with production at Pr and consumption at
Cr? It should be evident now that this can happen only if the
generalized Rybczynski locus PtRt for revenue seeking and the locus
PtRr for rent seeking were the same. Otherwise, the quota CrH will
exceed or fall short of the imports in the rent-seeking equilibrium (at
the implicit tariff defined by domestic price line PtE), and the final
rent-seeking equilibrium with import level CrH will involve a reduced
or increased implicit tariff.
In this important sense just defined, therefore, tariffs and quotas
cease, generally speaking, to be equivalent when revenue seeking and
rent seeking accompany them, respectively, and the nonequivalence
arises essentially from the differences in capital intensity that can
exist between the revenue-seeking and rent-seeking activities. This
nonequivalence is at a much deeper level and is based on a more
appropriate formulation of the problem than the Krueger (1974)
proposition of nonequivalence which rests on permitting rent seeking
for the quota and omitting altogether revenue seeking for the tariff.
An implication of the immediately preceding argument is that, if
revenue seeking is admitted on the tariff side just as rent seeking is
admitted on the quota side, this renders invalid Krueger's (1974,
p. 295) central conclusion that, subject to an identical import level,
the quota equilibrium will necessarily involve lower welfare vis-at-vis
the tariff equilibrium. Thus, fixing the import level at the amount
reached in the revenue-seeking equilibrium, it is easily seen that the
rent-seeking equilibrium will imply lower or higher welfare than the
revenue-seeking equilibrium according as the implicit tariff is higher
or lower in the rent-seeking equilibrium. The outcome therefore may
imply, in particular cases, that a quota is worse than a tariff, but it may
imply the opposite as well.
VII.

Measuring the Cost of Protection with Seeking

Finally, what happens to the familiar Hicksian measures of the cost of
protection, as in Johnson's (1960) classic paper on the cost of protection? Lack of space forbids us to illustrate our argument fully. But it is
evident that, in the presence of revenue seeking, the cost of protection
can be decomposed in two alternative ways: either (1) take the "true"
shift in production (e.g., from P* in free trade to Pr in tariff-withrevenue-seeking equilibrium in fig. 1) in measuring the production
cost (which would then be QN in terms of good 1 in fig. 1) and add to
it the usual consumption cost; or (2) decompose the "true" production
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cost (QN) into two elements: (i) the production cost corresponding to
the production shift as it would occur in the absence of revenue
seeking under the tariff (i.e., from P* to Pt in fig. 1) and (ii) the
further cost (or gain) corresponding to the added shift in production
thanks to revenue seeking (i.e., from Pt to Pr in fig. 1).
Correspondingly, if the analyst is considering the cost of a quota
with rent seeking that has led to an identical equilibrium shift in
production (P* to Pr in fig. 1), the two alternative ways of approaching
the cost of protection are equally applicable (with GE representing,
not tariff revenue, but the rents on the quota).
What does one make of Krueger's proposition that the cost of quota
protection is now the cost of its "tariff equivalent" (without revenue
seeking) "plus the value of the rents" (1974, p. 302), that is, that the
total cost in figure 1 is (i) the production cost corresponding to the
shift from P* to Pt plus (ii) the consumption cost plus (iii) the value of
the rents (GE)?
This is evidently inappropriate for two reasons: First, the value of
the rents is always positive, whereas, under conditions established in
Section IV above, the production cost of the seeking activity may be
negative and hence a gain (as in the shift from Pt to Pr in fig. 2 rather
than fig. 1), and second, even when the added production shift
imposed by rent seeking imposes a production cost, this will be less
than the value of the rents except under complete specialization in
production of the exportable good.17 Moreover, an empirical analyst
must also note that it is extremely unlikely that all rents will be sought
competitively.
For all these reasons, it is certain that the valid procedure to estimate the cost of protection in the presence of seeking activities is to
measure this cost conventionally, taking the production cost as that
defined by the shift in production to the seeking equilibrium from the
free-trade equilibrium. This does mean that the analyst must estimate, in general equilibrium with suitable specification of the seeking
activities as in this paper, the shift in production from the observed
seeking equilibrium (Pr) to the hypothetical free-trade equilibrium
(P*). But this has to be done in any case, even if seeking activity is at
zero level as in the conventional analysis.
VIII.

Concluding Observations

We hope to have opened up an entirely new, and important, aspect of
the theory of tariffs and welfare by analyzing revenue seeking. The
17
Both of these possibilities were excluded by the restrictive model of Krueger
(1974), which assumed complete specialization on the exportable good and that all rents
were sought competitively.
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analysis is further applicable, it should be evident, quite without
qualification to the welfare effect of tariffs (in the absence of revenue
seeking) when their collection involves a direct cost. For, in this case,
we would be considering a situation that is formally equivalent to
revenue seeking: The use of primary factors in revenue seeking
associated with tariffs is, to that extent, identical with the use of these
factors instead for revenue collection.
It should be emphasized that one of our central conclusions, that is,
that revenue seeking may be welfare improving, follows from the fact
that resource diversion to seeking activities occurs in a second-best
situation since the economy is characterized by a tariff distortion.
Therefore, conclusions based on first-best intuitions, that is, that
resource diversion to "unproductive" activities must be wasteful, will
not carry over into the analysis of seeking activities. It is this inadvertent confusion between first-best and second-best analyses which
really accounts for the erroneous conclusion by the analysts of rentseeking activities in the QR case that they necessarily increase the
losses imposed by the QR directly.
Finally, many extensions suggest themselves. For example, it would
be fruitful to establish the conditions under which the Metzler production paradox, demonstrated only as a possibility in this paper,
would arise. Similarly, the conditions under which a tariff would
have to be increased (decreased) in order to maintain a certain target
level of importable production could also be established. The interaction of tariff evasion with revenue seeking also provides yet another
example of the kind of policy-relevant welfare-theoretic analysis that
could be undertaken.
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